INTRODUCTION
Liquid hydrogen has been used by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory on Project Rover[l] since 1959. An early involvement in liquid hydrogen safety was the preparation of a set of instructions to drivers hauling liquid hydrogen to Jackass Flats. By the end of 1960, over 70,000 gal of liquid were received at Test Cell "A" at Jackass Flats. This liquid was vaporized by a stationary Linde pump vaporizer installation and stored at 3500 psi in the tank farm. The first dewars for liquid hydrogen storage were constructed in 1961, and the following shows the trend in dewar capacity and usage of LH Note, under "Turnover," the ratios of usage to storage capacity. Since loss through boiloff was only about 0.5% per day, these turnovers indicate the actual amount of liquid handling operations; receiving, transferring, cooldown, and usage as coolant, during reactor tests.
LIQUID-HYDROGEN SYSTEM
The liquid-hydrogen systems at both test cells consist of the following principal components:
Fill stations, for receiving LH2 in over-the-road transport dewars. Vaporizers and pumps, for filling the hydrogen gas-tank farm. Dewars, viz., two horizontal cylindrical dewars at Test Cell "A", with capacities of 28,000 gal each and two spherical dewars at Test Cell "C", with capacities of 50,000 gal each. The inner shells of these dewars are of AISI type 304 stainless steel and each is insulated with 3 ft of perlite, normally evacuated to about 50 fL. There are two safety relief valves on each dewar, set at 105 and 110 psig, and one rupture disk, set at 155 psig. (The vacuum annulus is also protected from internal pressure by one or more rupture disks.) These devices have sufficient relieving capacity to care for loss of vacuum. When the dewars are pressurized during operations, the rupture disks are valved off but the safety relief valves remain operative. Diking is not used in the dewar areas, but advantage is taken of sloping terrain. The two 28,000-gal dewars at Test Cell "A" were protected by sprinklers operating from a single automatic deluge valve, and the two 50,000-gal dewars at Test Cell "c" are protected by sprinklers operating from an individual deluge valve for each dewar; the valves activate automatically and have a manual shut-off. It is planned to separate the sprinklers on these dcwars into tViO zones, top and bottom, and to provide manual activation of the sprinklers to cool the dewars during high power reactor runs.
Turbine, and electrically driven pumps, used to propel liquid hydrogen to the reactor or to cryogenic test equipment, respectively.
Piping, consisting of vacuum-jacketed piping of type 304 stainless steel. The vacuum space is protected by spring-loaded relief devices. The discharge piping immediately adjoining the dewars contains, during quiesce!,t periods, helium at 3-5 psig above dewar pressure to prevent hydrogen leaks into the piping.
Hydrogen monitoring, utilizing J and W monitors in all indoor spaces which contain hydrogen piping. Each room has 4-5 units arranged to sound an alarm when two or more units (in one room) indicate 2% or more hydrogen. If the system becomes inoperative due to power failure or other reasons, the areas are monitored by personnel using approved hand-held analyzers.
HYDROGEN INCIDENTS
The following six incidents involving hydrogen have played a part in pointing up system deficiencies and have resulted in improved operations at LASL. They are mentioned here to make all those working with liquid hydrogen more conscious of the many possible hazards associated with this fluid. Incident A. A serious accident occurred in 1961; it did not involve liquid hydrogen, but the resulting changes probably significantly improved the safety of the liquid hydrogen operations. The reactor had been coupled to the test-cell face. For practical purposes, the reactor was an extension of the hydrogen piping. This is so because the hydrogen (coolant) is forced through longitudinal holes in the reactor until it exits through a nozzle on top of the reactor. At the time of the accident, a movable sheet-metal shed was over the reactor. * Ten people were inside and three nearby, engaged in a variety of last-minute tasks in preparation for a reactor run. Due to a leaky valve in the piping, hydrogen gas issued from the nozzle with an audible rush and was ignited by an unknown source, perhaps metal particles carried in the gas stream. The resulting explosion blew out the sheet-metal side panel of the shed and most of the occupants suffered bruises, fractures, and ruptured eardrums. The severest injury was a fractured heel bone. The eardrum damage suggests an overpressure of more than 10 psi and the fact that some personnel were blown several feet indicates that it was closer to 25 psi, but not much more-at more than 35 psi or so, fatalties may be expected [3] . Just before the explosion, a valve, later found to be leaking, had been opened and it is presumed that the gas that issued pushed into the shed the gas
